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Michael Herz

"Rulemaking as Politics," Thirty Years On

.the public interest, convenience and necessity"-were properly
informed by political judgments. The challenge, he acknowledged, was distinguishing the two settings.
The article appeared after the D.C. Circuit decision, but
before the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, in State Farm.
Chairman Scalia invoked that case in his conclusion:

T
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he last few decades have seen a surge in "citation
studies." No doubt these are driven in part by the ease
with which citations can now be counted-as elsewhere, we value what we can measure rather than measuring
what we value.And simply counting citations can be misleading, overlooking things such as the percentage of times the
citation begins with, say," But see" or "the source of this error
was." Still the quality and influence of an article or opinion
do have some correlation with the number of times it is cited.
And our field does well in such studies in that we can lay claim
to the most-cited Supreme Court decision of all, Chevron.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Chevron are, I fear,
Chair's Messages.These quarterly efforts are not written for
the ages. But this issue of the News marks the 30th anniversary
of a Chair's Message that deserves study and citation, and has
perhaps only become more interesting with the passage of time.
I thought I would mark the anniversary by returning to that
message from a distinguished predecessor and offering a few
comments in light of subsequent developments.
Section Chairman Antonin Scalia entitled his Spring 1982
Message Rulemaking as Politics. 1 His topic was the relationship
between rulemaking and democracy;"unless I miss my guess;'
he wrote, "we have entered a period in which the relationship
will be probed and tested, if not precisely defined:' He was
certainly right about that-both the "probed and tested" part
and the "not precisely defined" part.
Chairman Scalia's basic point was that agencies "may make
some decisions in rulemaking not because they are the best or
the most intelligent, but because they are what the people seem
to want." This principle, he complained, was being undercut by
a cluster of doctrinal developments. Laxer rules on ripeness and
standing meant that politically influenced rulemakings were
more likely to be subject to judicial review; courts were asserting greater control over the rulemaking agenda and agencies'
practical ability to forgo, abandon, or repeal rulemakings in light
of political considerations; the arbitrary and capricious test was
shifting from a loose rationality requirement to the hard look;
and new legislative and judicial requirements of transparency
were eliminating the "sine qua non of political accommodation,
confidential negotiation."
Scalia's point was not that all rulemaking is or should be
political; often an agency has a technocratic task to which
political considerations are irrelevant. But actions taken under
broad delegations-for example, to manage the airwaves "in

More needs to be done to bring the political, accommodationist, value-judgment aspect of rulemaking out of the
closet.When NHTSA comes to reconsider the passiverestraint rule ... , and if it chooses to adhere to its prior
course, it would be refreshing and instructive if, instead of
(or at least in addition to) blowing smoke in our eyes with
exhaustive technical and economic data, it said flat-out:
"It is our judgment that people should not be strapped in
cars if they don't want to be; nor should they have to spend
substantial sums for air-bags if they choose otherwise." A
political judgment, the retribution or reward for which
will be meted out by Congress, or at the polls, but not in
the courts.
So what happened? In the short term, the Scalia position
failed to carry the day. The air bags case went not back to
NHTSA but, instead, up to the Supreme Court. A year after
the Scalia article was published, the Supreme Court rejected
exactly the approach he urged. 2 However, the vote was close,
and Scalia's approach found support in a dissent by Justice
Rehnquist. The dissent does not cite the Scalia article but one
suspects Rehnquist had seen it (though that suspicion may just
be Section Chair delusions of grandeur). Rehnquist, pointing
out that the agency's enthusiasm for the passive restraints
rule had ebbed and flowed with changes in presidential
administrations, urged that the Court accept the most recent
reassessment precisely because it reflected a dominant national
opinion expressed through the electoral process. 3 Strikingly,
Justice White's opinion for the Court did not contradict Justice
Rehnquist's description of the political setting or conclude
that it was outweighed by other factors. Rather, he ignored
it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics of the rescission
irrelevant.
But State Farm was not, of course, the end of the story. Just
a year later came Chevron, which resonates powerfully with
Scalia's message. Like State Farm, Chevron involved a deregulatory policy shift by the new administration, but in this case
the Court accepted the change, emphasized agencies' electoral
accountability (as well as their expertise), and got out of the

continued on next page
Antonin Scalia, Chairman's Message: Rulemaking as Politics, 34ADMIN.
L. REv. v (1982). I did check, incidentally, and this article has been cited
27 times in the legal literature (though zero times in judicial opinions).
Not exactly John Rawls territory, but probably a Chair's Message record.
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way. Chevron is perhaps the Court's most honest opinion about
the breadth of congressional delegations, a frank recognition
that the legislature has left some questions of policy, or value, or
politics undecided, as Scalia emphasized.
In the intervening decades, Chevron has flourished while State
Fann has been in eclipse, at least in Supreme Court opinions.
In the lower courts the picture is more complex. A number of
con1111enters, including Elena Kagan, Christopher Edley, and
Kathryn Watts, have endorsed something like the Scalia position. This has been a period of increased presidential authority
and centralization, a key aspect of which is an emphasis on
the president's status as the one elected official with a national
constituency. An essential, though not the only, argument for
presidential control is that it legitimates discretionary agency
decisions that are non-technical and involve values and preferences.
The specific doctrinal proposition Chairman Scalia pressed,
however, remains contested. Is it "reasoned decisionmaking" if
an agency does something simply because the White House,
or Congress, or certain Members of Congress wants it to?This
question is remarkably unsettled. Massachusetts v. EPA4 suggests
that the answer is no. As Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule
have written, that opinion is in the State Farm tradition. 5
FCC v. Fox Television Stations,<' on the other hand, arguably points the other way, though really the issue split the
justices right down the middle.A statute prohibits television
broadcast of"indecent" material. Certain four-letter words
are "indecent," but the FCC had a longstanding position
that a single, unscripted, fleeting expletive was permissible.
During the second Bush Administration (and thus with a new
Republican chair), and under significant congressional pressure,
the Conmussion changed its position; under the new policy,
even fleeting expletives were prohibited. In a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that the change was not arbitrary and capricious.As
in State Farm, one question was whether a relevant (or perhaps
even sufficient) justification for the change was changed
preferences in the White House and/ or Congress.Writing for
four justices,Justice Scalia explicitly noted the political factors
behind the change and essentially endorsed them. The opinion
does not cite his 1982 Chairmans Jvlcssagc, but it is no surprise
that the two had the same author.
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, insisted that the "law
grants ... independent adnunistrative agencies broad authority
to determine relevant policy. But it does not pernut them to
make policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them
primarily upon unexplained policy preferences.""Where does,
and why would, the APA grant agencies the freedom to change
major policies on the basis of notlung more than political considerations or even personal whim?" For Breyer, then, "politics" is a
dirty word, to be uttered, at least by judges, not even fleetingly.

And where was Justice Kennedy, the fifth vote? He joined
almost all ofJustice Scalia's opinion, but not the portion where
Scalia disagrees with Justice Breyer about the role of politics.
And Kennedy's own opinion skirts that question. 7
So we must stay tuned. However, one important change,
a change that Chairman Scalia could not have anticipated in
1982, brings an added dimension to this pereruual debate. That
is the shift to electronic rulemaking.
Moving rulemaking on-line creates the opportunity (to
date, generally unrealized) for large-scale public participation.
If an agency can (indeed should) make decisions that reflect
"what the people seem to want;' as Chairman Scalia put it,
then arguably e-rulemaking enables it to do so with new
found accuracy and fervor. Most lay comments do not tell the
agency anything it does not already know other than indicating
sometlung about public opinion, but they do accomplish that.
For that reason, more than one observer has expressed concern
that mass public commenting could transform rulemaking
from a process of gathering information and arguments into a
sort of referendum. That possibility is generally decried. But if
rulen1aking "is" politics, why not have a referendum via notice
and con1111ent?
Three reasons come to nund. First, even a large number of
comments may be an inaccurate guide to public opinion since
they may be unrepresentative. Second, as Chairman Scalia
said, rulemaking is not always or only politics; in some settings
political acconunodation and value judgments are out of place.
Tlurd, in a representative rather than direct democracy, the
existing mechanisms for accommodating public preferences,
i.e.White House and congressional oversight, may be more
appropriate, if not constitutionally required. Suppose large-scale
lay comments support a different approach than that favored by
the White House; what should the agency do? I have complete
confidence that Chairn1an Scalia and Professor Scalia and
Justice Scalia would all say that the agency should follow White
House preferences. In the 1982 article he stated that "[w]hen
I say 'what the public wants' I refer not to the latest Gallup
poll, but to the manifestations of the popular will through the
political process." Substitute "the weight of public con1111ents"
for "latest Gallup poll" and the proposition stands.
The exact role of politics in rulemaking is yet to be resolved.
E-rulemaking makes the question more salient, and more
difficult, than ever. 8 But, as Chairman Scalia pointed out, the
problem exists independently of the technology of rulemaking,
and what really makes it so hard is that the relationship is not
constant. Like so much else in law, the answer, frustratingly, is "it

depends."O
7

The opinions are usefully parsed in Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look
Review, Policy Clw11ge, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555
(2011).
' Those who are interested in the particular question of the role of the
public in rulemaking will want to attend the Section's Spring Meeting
in Princeton, New Jersey, which will include a panel devoted to just this
topic on April 20. Details can be found elsewhere in this issue.
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' Jody Freeman & Adrian Vcrmeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: Fro111 Politics
to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51 (2008).
'' 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
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